How Board Diversity Affects Firm Performance In Emerging Markets: Evidence On Channels In Controlled Firms
Yazarlar (3)
Melsa Ararat Merrell
Sabancı Üniversitesi, Türkiye
Hatice Mine Aksu
Türkiye
Prof. Dr. Ayşe TANSEL ÇETİN
Yalova Üniversitesi, Türkiye
| Makale Türü |
Özgün Makale
(SSCI, AHCI, SCI, SCI-Exp dergilerinde yayınlanan tam makale)
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| Dergi Adı | Corporate Governance: An International Review | ||
| Dergi ISSN | 0964-8410 Wos Dergi Scopus Dergi | ||
| Dergi Tarandığı Indeksler | SSCI | ||
| Makale Dili | İngilizce | Basım Tarihi | 01-2015 |
| Cilt / Sayı / Sayfa | 23 / 2 / 83–103 | DOI | 10.1111/corg.12103 |
| Makale Linki | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/corg.12103 | ||
| Özet |
| AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueWe investigate the indirect effect of a board's demographic diversity on firm performance via board monitoring in a context where boards are relatively homogeneous with respect to structural diversity, using data from Turkey. We contextualize our investigation by exploring the influence of ownership configurations on the effect of diversity.Research Findings/InsightsWe find a positive and non‐linear relationship between demographic diversity and performance, mediated by the board's monitoring efforts. The effect of monitoring is found to be contingent upon (moderated by) the controlling shareholders’ propensity to expropriate, measured by the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights, i.e. the wedge. We report that demographic diversity enhances firm performance by mitigating the negative effect of the wedge on board monitoring.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur results provide empirical support for the importance of contextual factors in the relationship between diversity and performance. Our framework and the compound diversity and board‐monitoring indices we construct may prove useful to researchers.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsRegulators can use our findings in formulating recommendations or regulations related to desirable characteristics of boards. Our results are also instructive for investors and proxy advisors and indicate that the mere existence of monitoring vehicles may be insufficient to prevent expropriation by dominant shareholders, but diverse boards may mitigate the propensity to expropriate. Board members and shareholders should also benefit from the findings in creating boards that are more diligent monitors. |
| Anahtar Kelimeler |
BM Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma Amaçları
| Atıf Sayıları |